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Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence on how  EU leading firms adjusted to European economic
integration with respect to the following  strategic variables: entry/exit decisions in the
product/geographic space (diversification/multinationality). A novel dataset, including detailed
information on  firms’ output across industries and  countries for a sample of  100 EU leading firms in
1987 and 1993, also enables us to provide preliminary evidence on the  “globalisation - return to core
business” hypothesis. The econometric analysis of entries/exits in the primary industry suggests that the
Single  Market program affected company strategy by making multinational activity more necessary to
face increased competitive pressure. Our results are thus far more consistent with a “think European
view” than with the “return to core country” hypothesis, as implied by fuller exploitation of scale
economies and comparative advantages.
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1. Introduction
The primary purpose of this paper is to provide fresh empirical evidence on how  EU leading
firms have adjusted to increased European economic integration with respect to two strategic
variables: entry/exit decisions in the product space (diversification) and entry/exit decisions in the
geographic space (multinationality). However, since one of the expected effects of European
integration in general and of the Single European Market (SEM, hereafter)  program in particular, is
an increase in the toughness of competition, the purpose of this paper is more general and aims at
analyzing the impact of a shift in the competitive regime on firms’ entry/exit strategies.
Obviously, EU firms do not operate in a vacuum and their entry/exit strategies might depend
on other, perhaps world-wide, factors. In particular, according to both financial press and academic
research1, recent years have witnessed remarkable changes in the organisation of firms throughout
the  world. Thus, terms as “globalisation” and “return to core business” have entered common
language. On the one hand, at the geographic level, it has often been argued that  the “globalisation”
of competition has led to a dramatic increase in the scale of multinational operations. On the other
hand,  there is anecdotal evidence that the trend in product space has been apparently in the
opposite direction. Today’s popular  terms as “return to core”, “refocusing”, “de-diversifying”, all
describe recent efforts  pursued by firms  to concentrate on a smaller range of industries, in each of
which the firm aims to reach a leading position.
In spite of all these casual evidence, as far as we know there has been no comprehensive
analysis on whether these phenomena are widespread among EU leading firms.  Also, if  evidence
supporting the “globalisation - return to core”  hypothesis is found, it is not however clear whether  it
has been fostered or hindered by European integration. To shed some light on these issues we make
use of a novel dataset which includes detailed information on  firms’ output across industries and
countries for a sample of  100 EU leading firms and for two distinct years, 1987 and 1993.
Furthermore,  since we know a priori which type of industries were most likely to be affected by the
SEM program the possibility of comparing  changes in corporate structure of  firms operating in
“1992 most affected industries” to those of  firms operating in less affected industries should allow us
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to isolate the impact of specific measures that were, almost by definition, aimed at fostering European
integration.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 defines the dimensions of
corporate structure to be considered, and discusses some of the likely impact of European
integration, “globalisation” and “return to the core”. Section 3 describes the methodological
framework which enables us to organise available information on firms’ entry and exit decisions in an
integrated and coherent way.  Section 4 describes the  main changes in corporate structure that
occurred between 1987 and 1993 for our sample of large European firms.  Section 5  comments
upon the econometric results and links empirical evidence with ex-ante theoretical predictions.
Section 6 concludes.
2. European Integration and  Firms’ Strategies
In the view of policy-makers who signed the Single European Act in 1987, the
implementation of the 300 or so detailed measures were expected to affect EU manufacturing
positively in a variety of ways. These measures included the abolition of all remaining tariffs and
quotas, but they were mainly aimed at the non-tariff barriers of: frontier controls, national differences
in technical regulations, public procurement biases in favour of domestic producers; and so-called
fiscal frontiers created by differences in tax levels and regimes. In particular, the “official” EU view
identified two crucial mechanisms: cost savings and increased competitive pressure.
Cost savings should have occurred both directly, following the elimination of non-tariff
barriers, and indirectly, because of  a more efficient division of labour among member states. In turn,
this would have allowed both a fuller exploitation of scale or learning economies and a higher
specialisation of production based on country specific comparative advantages. More competitive
pressure would have instead been the result of a larger number of firms from different member states
competing in a larger and integrated European market. This aggressive competitive stance would
have increased social welfare because of reduced prices, lower inefficiency and speedier innovation.
Some of the theoretical implications for industrial structure at the EU level have been
formalised by Davies, Lyons et al.  (1996). As the fixed and variable costs of exporting decline
                                                                                                                                                        
1 On this issue see Markides (1995) and Davies and Petts (1997) for US and UK firms respectively.
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because of the removal of non-tariff barriers, artificially segmented national markets are increasingly
replaced by a larger integrated market. As a consequence, they show that in the new equilibrium,
prices fall and inefficient producers exit, whereas efficient firms  typically expand their size to exploit
scale economies. Note that these results are obtained without assuming that  integration increases the
toughness of price competition, but simply as a consequence of market expansion. Obviously, if
integration indeed introduces tougher price competition, prices will fall even further as well as the
number of firms sustainable in equilibrium. In short, the end result is a European market place which
comprises more and larger sellers than was previously the case in the national market place. Finally,
they also show that in industries where endogenous sunk costs, such as R&D and advertising
expenditures, are used as competitive weapons, market enlargement will be followed by the
escalation of such costs by leading firms. Typically, this will lead to an EU market structure which is
more concentrated than when firms compete largely on the basis of price.
The theoretical implications on  firms’ multinationality and diversification optimal strategies of
a shift in the competitive regime associated with market integration are not easily obtainable from
formal modelling. However, informal reasoning suggests that firms under increased competitive
pressure might find it rational to exit (not to enter) secondary industries, especially if the scale of
production is low and there are no economies of scope. This behaviour is popularly known as
“return to core” strategy, and might be observed  as firm’s reaction to an increase  in competition in
both its secondary industry or its core industry.
As far as entry/exit decisions in the geographic space are concerned,  the “officia
predicts that the reduction in the marginal costs of exporting within the EU, which should have
followed the abolition of non-tariff barriers should make intra-EU multinational operations less
necessary. As a consequence, we should observe  multinational firms which set up an excessive
number of production plants in order to overcome non-tariff barriers,  reducing the number of their
plants and increasing production at each plant. This prediction is based on a rather narrow concept
of EU integration, which is basically equated to unimpaired trade among member states.  However,
following Davies, Lyons et al. (1996), integration is a term which can be interpreted more widely in
order to include not only large trade flows, but also integrated corporate strategies. SEM can thus be
expected to have made many more firms “think European”, even when the product is not intrisically
tradeable across frontiers, for instance because of  high transport costs. In other words, even when
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the abolition of non-tariff barriers may not have resulted in a single integrated marketplace, it may
have encouraged firms to formulate their strategy on an European scale.  This happens to be the case
whenever  strategic decisions on product characteristics (both horizontal and vertical differentiation)
are taken at the EU (or even world) level, even though price and quantity competition still occurs in
national fragmented markets. This might occur if the move towards common standards and technical
harmonisation lead to a narrowing of tastes differences between consumers in different member
states2. In these circumstances, the oligopoly game might involve an escalation of endogenous sunk
costs (RD and, possibly, advertising expenditures), increasing dominance by a small number of firms,
increased oligopolistic interdependence, and multinational entry in a number of national markets (i.e.
multimarket contacts) for strategic reasons.
Obviously, not all manufacturing industries were expected to be equally affected  by the
completion of the Single European Market (SEM, hereafter). On the basis of a number of so-called
“structural criteria”, 40 industries were identified as those industries “most affected” by 1992 (CEC,
1990).  The structural criteria included i) the level of non-tariff barriers and the dispersion of prices
for identical products between member states as measures of the degree of fragmentation of EU
markets; ii) the level of penetration of intra-EU imports as measure of the degree of
internationalization iii) the potential for economies of scale as proxy for  potential reduction in costs
for European firms.
3. Entry and Exit Decisions: Methodology and Data
Real world large firms usually operate in more than one industry (diversification) and in more
than one country (multinationality). From this point of view, the firm’s present corporate structure
reflects past entry (and exit) decisions in foreign countries and/or in industries different from its
primary activity. Accordingly, at any point in time, firms’ corporate structures differ from each other
depending on entries occurred in foreign countries and/or secondary industries. Thus, a firm can be
multinational without being diversified, or viceversa, or it can be both. In this case, different structures
are possible, depending  on whether firms are multinational in more than one industry or, analogously,
                                                
2 The idea here is that non-tariff  barriers affect not only trade (trade barriers) but also direct investment (direct
investment barriers).
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on whether they are diversified in more than one country. The latter clearly implies overlapping
between multinationality and diversification. In fact, entering a  secondary industry in a foreign
country affects the extent of  both multinationality and diversification.
More precisely, a firm can produce one product in one country, more than one product in
one country (the firm is locally diversified), one product in more than one country (a single-product
multinational), more than one product in more than one country (a diversified multinational)3. As a
result, the firm’s corporate structure can be roughly described by its output shares in its primary
industry, whether in the home country (HC-PI) or abroad (FC-PI), and in secondary industries,
whether produced in the domestic market (HC-SI) or in foreign countries (FC-SI). However, by
comparing the firm’s output shares’ distributions in two points in time we cannot observe entry and
exit decisions, as indeed we are observing how the firm’s output has been relocated across countries
and across industries. This, of course, can occur via an increase (reduction) in the quantity produced
in other industries/countries by already existing plants or because the firm has opened (closed) a new
plant  or, alternatively, it has taken over (divested)  an already existing plant. Obviously, only the
latter can strictly be defined as entry (exit).
In order to measure entries and exits, more refined data are required than aggregate output
shares. What is needed, for any individual firm, is a matrix with industries in the rows and countries in
the columns, where each cell reports output in a given country and in a given industry at the finest
possible level. In other words, information must include estimates of its domestic and foreign
production in all industries in which it operates.
A data base with such characteristics was constructed for a set of 313 leading European
firms for 1987. It was  assembled as a part of a wide ranging study of the structure of European
Union Manufacturing and is fully discussed in Davies, Lyons et al. (1996). Its salient features for
present purposes are that it includes all the five leading producers (at the EU level) in each of the 100
3-digit NACE manufacturing industries, observed for 1987, and that each firm aggregate EU
production in each industry is disaggregated into separate figures for each member state in which it
                                                
3 Other combinations can be obviously envisaged and Davies, Rondi and Sembenelli (1997) show that this is
sometime the case with real world firms.
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was produced4. As part of an ongoing project on the structural changes in EU manufacturing, we
have updated all relevant information to 1993 for the largest 100 surviving firms after excluding non-
EU multinationals with operations within EU boundaries5.
Let us define with firm i’s primary industry (PI) the industry with the largest EU share
of output in 1987 and with firm i’s home country (HC) its country of origin. By comparing the two
matrices (1987 and 1993), entry and exit decisions at the firm level  can thus be observed between
1987 and 1993, i.e. over the Single European Market program implementation period. In particular,
it is possible to quantify for each firm: i) the number of entries (exits) in secondary industries - home
country (home diversification), ii) the number of entries (exits) in foreign countries - primary industry
(primary multinationality), iii) the number of entries (exits) in foreign countries - secondary industries
(diversified multinationality or multinational diversification).
4. Descriptive Statistics
Empirical evidence from the U.S. (see Markides, 1995) reports for the past decade quite a
widespread trend towards corporate restructuring by means of  “refocusing” or “return to core
Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990 and Davies and Petts, 1997). This is generally
understood as a reduction in the extent of  diversification in order to recover profitability, after twenty
years of full immersion in conglomeration. Can we provide any evidence that this is also occurring in
the EU? One of the ex-ante expectation is precisely that the increased competitive pressures in both
the core business and in secondary industries  should draw companies efforts towards efficiency,
possibly by divesting marginal activities in unrelated businesses (see section 2). Obviously, the
“return to corporate specialisation” hypothesis is not at odds with an increase in the acquisitions of
related businesses. Unfortunately, this would be blurred by the simple analysis of the entry and exit
decisions, independent of the directions of diversification.
Table 1 summarises data on the distribution of output shares in the product/geographic space
in 1987 and 1993 for the top 100 EU owned firms, as identified in section 3. The hypothesis of
                                                
4 As it was a project on the structure of EU manufacturing industry, all non-manufacturing activities were
excluded as well as multinational operations outside the EU boundaries.
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corporate refocusing on the primary industry is not clearly borne out by the data. Adding up the PI
output shares produced both at home and abroad, we find that production in the primary industry did
indeed fall from 57.5% to 52.8% on average, with the share produced in foreign countries rising
from 9.8% to 14.2%. Quite to the contrary, the evidence suggests that diversification has kept going
on over the period, especially in foreign countries - the FC-SI output share has increased by almost
5 percentage points, whereas diversification in the home country has remained stable. Summarising,
there appears to be an increasing trend towards both multinationality and diversification amongst the
largest European companies, but with an interesting twist, whereby the growth in both primary and
secondary industries was carried out via cross-border operations, whereas diversification has
increased mainly because of a more pronounced multinational penetration.
A breakdown by country of origin of the top 100 firms (see Table 2) confirms that the
increase in multinationality is a widespread trend which extends to both primary and diversified
activities. Only Dutch and Belgian firms report a decline in diversification abroad (FC-SI), whereas
French, Italian and British companies reveal quite pronounced increases in  foreign shares. On the
other hand, diversification in the home country (HC-SI) appears to be declining in all but German
firms. As the number of German firms is disproportionally large in our sample, it is likely that the
average results in Table 1 were somewhat biased to hide an underlying trend towards de-
diversification, at least in the home country.
So far we have analysed the changing pattern of output shares across countries and
industries for top 100 EU owned firms, in other words, the relocation of their production between
1987 and 1993. We now turn to entry and exit decisions, as defined in section 3. Table 3 reports the
average country/industry presence in 1987 and 1993 (columns 1 and 4, respectively) as well as the
average number of entries and exits by the top 100 firms. As it can be seen, entries outperformed
exits between 1987 and 1993, thus confirming a tendency for large companies to widen the scope of
their operations across both member states and industries. However, more interesting insights may
be obtained by looking at how entries and exits are actually distributed in the product/geographic
space. We thus learn that, for the average firm,  cross-border entries outnumbered exits in both the
                                                                                                                                                        
5 Since in our empirical analysis special attention is paid to changes in home country diversification and  primary
industry multinationality,  we have been forced to exclude non-EU multinationals. In fact, for these firms the
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 10/1997
10
primary industry6 and secondary activities, whereas an opposite pattern is revealed by diversification
in the home country (HC-SI). As mentioned above, diversification and multinationality overlap in the
foreign country/secondary industry output space. Therefore, in the following we will focus on entry
and exit decisions in the primary industry abroad (FC-PI) and in secondary industries at home (HC-
SI), where the actual trade-off between diversification and multinationality can be explicitly observed.
Consistingly with previous evidence on output shares, Tables 4 confirms that, on average,
multinational penetration in the primary industry, via new entries, i.e. by opening or acquiring a new
plant abroad, has increased in all countries. On the other hand, Table 5 shows that de-diversification
from secondary industries in the home country was a widespread strategy amongst the largest EU
companies. Except for German (and Dutch) firms, exits outnumber entries for the average firm, thus
revealing that the return to core business in the home country has occurred by reducing the output
share as well as by closing plants in secondary industries. This also suggests that (pure)
multinationality may have provided a substitute for (pure) diversification, at least for those companies
which face country limits to growth.
The latter suggestion seems to be borne out (Table 6) if we look at the correlation matrix
between entries/exits at home and abroad. Not only multinational penetration in the primary industry
is negatively correlated with domestic diversification (r = - 0.076), it is also positively related with
exits from secondary industries at home, thus confirming the suggested trade-off between
multinationality and diversification. On the other hand, however, the positive correlation between
cross-country entries in the primary industry and in diversified activities confirms that there is a
tendency for the largest EU companies to grow via multinationality anyway (possibly revealing an
urgency to escape from country limits and/or to establish multi-market and multi-country contacts
with their rivals).
5. Empirical Results
From the descriptive statistics presented in section 4, it emerges that EU leading firms have
increased the degree of  multinationality in their primary industry. This finding holds both if one looks
                                                                                                                                                        
notion of a home country/primary industry within EU boundaries  is at best questionable.
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at the changes in output shares between 1987 and 1993  and if one compares the number of country
entries and exits. Analogously, with the exception of German firms, EU leading firms have decreased
the degree of diversification in their home country. This empirical fact is suggested by the descriptive
statistics on output shares and it is confirmed by the reduction in the number of industries between
1987 and 1993. Overall these results point out that: i) there is some evidence in favour of the “return
to core” hypothesis, at least as far as home diversification is concerned7 and ii) the  prediction of a
reduction in multinational activity in primary industry,  motivated by the possibility of exploiting plant-
level scale economies is not supported by the data.
However, for more convincing empirical evidence, a more rigorous approach to hypothesis
testing is required. The starting  assumption of the empirical work presented in this section is that
European integration and, more in general, “globalisation” are associated with the toughening of
price/product competition and that this association is stronger in industries where non-tariff barriers
were important before the completion of the SEM program, i.e. the so-called forty “most affected”
industries.
With this perspective in mind,  we present four sets of exploratory econometric estimates
where dependent variables are respectively: i) number of entries in foreign countries - primary
industry (FC-PI),  ii) number of exits from foreign countries - primary industry, iii) number of entries
in home country - secondary industries (HC-SI), iv) number of exits from home country-secondary
industries. Since by construction all dependent variables can assume only non-negative discrete
values, we make use of the Poisson regression model for estimation purposes8. We then assume that
dependent variables Y1, Y2,...., Yn have independent Poisson distributions with parameters, l1, l2,
...,ln, respectively. Hence,
Prob (Yi=yi) = lyie-li/yi! (1)
                                                                                                                                                        
6 The somewhat unexpected exit figure in the home country primary industry (second row) is due to four firms
which apparently abandoned the industry which accounted for their largest EU share of output in 1987.
7 From our previous empirical work, it emerges that it is more difficult to explain  “home” diversification than
“foreign” diversification . This is turn might suggest that “home” diversification has often no strong industrial
logic.
8 In the Poisson model the variance is assumed to be equal to the mean. For all equations we also estimated
negative binomial models where overdispersion can be tested. For all reported equations the hypothesis of no
overdispersion is not rejected by the data.
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Assuming that li are log-linearly dependent on the explanatory variables, we can write:
lnli =b0 + Sjbjxij (2)
Maximum likelihood estimators of (2) are readily available in most specialised econometric
packages9.
In entry/exit in foreign countries/primary industry equations, basic explanatory variables can
be summarised as  follows:
Sjbjxij = b1Ci + b2GRi + b3MSi + b4CRi + b5SEMi (3)
where:
C*i = Number of countries (in logs)  firm i was not present in 1987 in its primary industry. This
variable is used only in entry equations;
Ci = Number of countries (in logs)  firm i was present in 1987 in its primary industry. This variable is
used only in exit equations;
these two variables capture the number of entry/exit options available to the firm. In the entry
equation, it  is expected to be positive if firms operating in a limited number of countries are more
likely to enter new foreign countries than firms whose operations are already widely scattered
throughout Europe. Analogously,  in the exit equation it is expected to be positive if firms operating in
a large number of countries are more likely to close foreign plants than firms operating in a small
number of countries.
GRi = 1991-1987 EU Growth Rate in firm i’s primary industry. This variable measures expected
growth prospects and is expected to enter positively in entry equations and negatively in exit
equations.
                                                
9 For the ML estimates of (2) we used Limdep 7.
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CRi  = 1987 5-firm Concentration Ratio in firm i’s primary industry. Since in modern Industrial
Organisation concentration is seen as determined both by the basic conditions of the industry and the
stance of competition, in the present context this variable is used mainly as a single proxy for the
initial conditions of the industry. Given that most industries were likely to be in disequilibrium (from
local markets to an integrated market) in 1987, it might also be argued that an high level of EU
concentration might be associated with industries already, at least partly, integrated in 1987.
MSi = 1987 firm i’s  EU  Market Share in its primary industry. This variable captures the position of
firm i in its primary industry before the starting of the SEM program. For the purpose of this paper
we are not interested in whether market share is a proxy for efficiency or market power or it simply
reflects the fact that, ceteris paribus,  firm i comes from a large EU country. Our working assumption
is simply that firms with initial high market shares are better equipped to cope with increasing
competition. As a consequence, if European integration makes multinational activity more necessary,
we expect this variable to enter with a positive sign in entry equations, and with a negative sign in exit
equations.
SEMi =  Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if firm  i’s primary industry was identified as one
of  “1992 most affected industries”, 0 otherwise. Obviously, this is our crucial variable, since it is
then expected to capture the distinctive impact of the SEM program on firms’ entry/exit decisions.
As discussed in details in section 2,  these variables cannot be univocally signed. In fact, a positive
sign in the exit equation (and perhaps a negative sign in the entry equation) is consistent with the
hypothesis that the abolition of non-tariff barriers has made multinationality less necessary, whereas a
positive sign in the entry equation (and perhaps a negative sign in the exit equation) is consistent with
the alternative “think European” view.
The first column in Table 7 reports the results of the basic foreign country/primary industry
entry equation.  Both  C*i and GRi are positive and significant as expected. On the contrary, CRi is
negative and significant, thus supporting the idea that an initial high level of concentration makes
entries in new countries less likely. More relevant to the issues discussed in this paper, both MSi and
SEMi  are positive and significant. This in turn implies that: i) even within a sample of leading firms,
being  in a stronger initial position makes further entries in new countries more likely, and ii) firms
operating in industries “most affected” by the SEM program are more likely to enter new countries.
This result is consistent with the “think European” view that predicts an increase in multinational
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activity as a result of more integration. To check whether this strong result is robust to changes in
model specification, we  included in the basic equation a proxy for the degree of  economies of scale
in the industry, EOSi, both additively and interacted with SEMi. The idea is that integration should
favour trade and then discourage entry in new countries, especially in these industries where
rationalisation advantages are expected to be large.  This hypothesis is not borne out by the data,
since both coefficients do not significantly differ from zero. Alternatively, it might be thought that this
substitution effect is more likely to be detected in those industries where non-tariff barriers were high.
We then split our “most affected” industries according to whether barriers were high, SEMHIGHi or
moderate SEMMODi. Coefficients on both variables are negative and significant. Also, contrary to
what the substitution hypothesis would predict, the coefficient is larger in absolute value (but not
significantly larger) for firms operating in SEMHIGH industries than for firms operating in SEMMOD
industries.
Table 8 reports the results for foreign countries-primary industry  exit equations. Overall
results are less satisfactory than the ones for entry. In particular, whereas Ci has the expected
positive sign, both the growth rate, GRi and CRi are not significantly different from zero. However,
the evidence  on MSi and SEMi allows us to shed further light on the likely effect of integration and,
possibly, competition on the level of multinational activity. Firstly, MSi  has a negative impact on
exits. This finding is totally consistent and reinforces the results from entry equations. Not only being
a strong leader encourages entry, but being in a weaker position makes exit a more likely strategy.
Secondly, the coefficient on SEMi  is not significantly different from zero. Again, this result is not
consistent with the prediction that the abolition of non-tariff barriers should make multinational
production a less profitable strategy compared to trade. As for entry equations, we performed a
number of experiments, by adding EOSi or, alternatively, by splitting SEMi on the basis of the
strength of non-tariff barriers. Results are reported in the second and third columns of Table 8. The
bottom line is that the overall picture remains virtually unaltered.
Finally, in Table 9 we report some regression results aimed at explaining home country -
secondary industries entry/exit decisions. In the spirit of this paper, we are mainly interesting in testing
whether changes in primary industry  conditions also  affect decisions in the product space.
Accordingly,  we used the same explanatory variables as in Tables 7 and 8 with the exception of  Ci
replaced by Si , where:
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S*i =  Number of industries (in logs)  firm i was not present in its home country in 1987. This
variable is used only in entry equations.
S*i =  Number of industries (in logs)  firm i was present in its home country in 1987. This variable is
used only in exit equations;
these variables are meant to  capture the number of entry/exit options available to the firm.
The main results can be summarised as follows. Firstly, operating in a larger number of
industries has a positive impact on both entry and exit decisions.  Secondly, and more relevant to the
issues discussed here,  it is interesting to observe that MSi has a positive effect (even if not very
significant) in the entry equation and a negative effect (even if not very significant)  in the exit
equation, thus suggesting that being in a “strong” position in its primary industry makes firm
expansion in other industries a more likely strategy. This might be attributed to the existence of limits
to growth in primary industry. Alternatively, MSi  might be a proxy for the firm’s general economic
conditions.  Finally, SEMi enters with a negative and significant sign in the entry equation, this in turn
providing suggestive evidence that an increase in competition in its primary industry deters the firm’s
new entries in other industries, at least in its home country. Unfortunately, a negative (even if not very
significant) sign is also found in the exit equation, and this is something that is difficult to rationalise.
6. Conclusions
Much current debate concerns how the completion of the internal market did (and will) affect
corporate strategy within the EU boundaries. This paper offers a new perspective on these issues by
providing empirical evidence on how the top 100 EU owned companies have adjusted their entry
and exit decisions in the product/geographic space to the challenges of the SEM program, basically
increased competitive pressure within a larger integrated market and a call for a fuller exploitation of
scale and learning economies as well as comparative advantages. On the other hand, we also link our
results to the world-wide debate on the reorganisation of the largest corporations whereby a
dramatic increase in “globalisation” coexists with a “return to core business” trend, especially
pronounced for US companies.
Preliminary evidence from descriptive statistics provides consistent support to the hypothesis
of a substantial increase in the scale of multinational operations, both in the primary industry and in
diversified activities. The “refocusing” trend is then not clearly borne out by the data, at least as far
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as diversification in foreign countries is concerned, over the 1987-1993 period. However, what the
data show for all but German companies, is a de-diversification trend within the national boundaries
(as measured by a decline in the output shares produced in secondary industries in the home country
as well as a relatively larger number of exits), which in turn would confirm that domestic
diversification is usually less characterised by an industrial logic.  As suggested by the econometric
analysis, being in a strong position in the primary industry makes local diversification a more likely
growth strategy, provided that the firm is not operating in an industry which is sensitive to the SEM
program. This highlights limits to growth in the core business as a motivation for diversification at
home, but only for firms which are not challenged by the increased competitive pressure enhanced by
the European integrated market.
 Turning to the most relevant issues of the paper, the econometric analysis of entries and exits
in the primary industry allows us to confirm that European integration appears to have affected
corporate strategies by making multinational activity more necessary to face increased competitive
pressure. In fact, we find that entry in the primary industry in foreign countries is more likely for firms
which happen to be operating in the 40 industries comprised in the list of the “most affected” by the
SEM program, and for firms which are in a stronger initial position (i.e. the higher is their 1987
market share in that industry). Notably, this result appears to be robust when we extend the model to
test for the most clear cut ex-ante expectation of the SEM program: that multinationality (new entries
abroad) should be discouraged whenever production economies of scale are the greater source of
efficiency gains. In short, our results are far more consistent with the “think European”, which entails
more pronounced multinational penetration, than with the “return to core country” hypothesis.
The impact of the SEM program over exit decisions is less clearly spelled out by the
econometric analysis, as operating in either a “sensitive” or a scale intensive industry does not appear
to encourage exits. Quite to the contrary, when we consider the interaction of the SEM program and
economies of scale, we find very limited evidence that the “de-multinationalisation” hypothesis seems
to apply to precisely those firms which are not operating in one of the “most affected industries”.   
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Table 1: Production shares (%)
Year 1987 Mean Std.dev 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
HC-PI share 47.7 24.8 28.4 46.6 60.4
FC-PI share 9.8 12.2 0.0 4.6 18.4
HC-SI share 34.9 22.0 18.3 36.5 51.1
FC-SI share 7.6 12.0 0.0 3.0 10.4
Year 1993 Mean Std.dev 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
HC-PI share 38.6 (-) 24.6 21.3 (-) 34.2 (-) 56.1 (-)
FC-PI share 14.2 (+) 17.8 1.4 (+) 8.1 (+) 18.6 (+)
HC-SI share 34.9 (=) 23.4 16.7 (-) 31.8 (-) 53.5 (+)
FC-SI share 12.4 (+) 14.3 1.5 (+) 6.0 (+) 20.9 (+)
Legend:
HC: Home Country
FC: Other EU Countries
PI: Primary Industry (3-digit)
SI: Secondary Industries
(+) denotes an increase between 1987 and 1993; (-) denotes a decrease.
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Table 2: Production shares (Mean values)
Year 1987 HC-PI share FC-PI share HC-SI share FC-SI - share
Germany [32] 51.3 5.3 38.4 5.0
U. K. [29] 48.5 9.2 35.4 6.8
France [21] 51.4 13.6 29.7 5.3
Italy [9)] 39.1 10.9 41.2 8.8
Holland [6] 21.9 24.1 26.3 27.7
Belgium-Lux. [3] 53.6 3.5 26.5 16.4
Year 1993 HC-PI share FC-PI share HC-SI share FC-SI - share
Germany 40.4 (-) 7.8 (+) 44.7 (+) 7.1 (+)
U. K. 40.3 (-) 14.3 (+) 33.5 (-) 11.8 (+)
France 39.3 (-) 17.5 (+) 27.5 (-) 15.7 (+)
Italy 34.1 (-) 12.0 (+) 36.8 (-) 17.1(+)
Holland 14.4 (-) 35.0 (+) 23.6 (-) 27.0(-)
Belgium-Lux. 58.3 (+) 22.7 (+) 10.3 (-) 8.6(-)
Legend: as in Table 1
Number of firms in square brackets
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Table 3: Number of entries and exits
1987 ENTRIES EXITS 1993
Total 13.54 7.81 5.17 16.18 (+)
- HC-PI 1.00 .00 .04 .96 (-)
- FC-PI 2.15 1.21 .45 2.91 (+)
- HC-SI 6.51 2.33 2.74 6.10 (-)
- FC-SI 3.88 4.27 1.94 6.21 (+)
Table 4: Number of FC-PI entries and exits
1987 ENTRIES EXITS 1993
Total 2.2 1.2 0.5 2.9 (+)
Germany 1.6 1.3 0.2 2.5 (+)
UK 1.5 0.8 0.6 1.8 (+)
France 3.0 1.8 0.5 4.3 (+)
Italy 2.0 1.2 0.7 2.6 (+)
Holland 5.5 1.2 1.0 5.7 (+)
Belgium 1.7 2.3 0.0 4.0 (+)
Table 5: Number of  HC-SI  entries and exits
1987 ENTRIES EXITS 1993
Total 6.5 2.3 2.7 6.1 (-)
Germany 6.2 3.4 1.5 8.1 (+)
UK 6.3 2.1 3.4 5.0 (-)
France 5.6 1.2 3.0 3.9 (-)
Italy 13.3 3.4 6.0 10.7 (-)
Holland 3.7 0.5 0.5 3.7 (=)
Belgium 3.7 1.0 2.3 2.3 (-)
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Table 6: Correlation matrix
FC-PI
entries
FC-PI
exits
HC- SI
entries
HC - SI
exits
FC - SI
entries
FC - SI
exits
FC-PI
entries
1
FC-PI
exits
-0.089 1
HC- SI
entries
-0.076 -0.109 1
HC - SI
exits
0.018 -0.038 0.189 1
FC - SI
entries
0.215 0.059 0.230 0.185 1
FC - SI
exits
-0.099 0.213 0.051 0.112 0.191 1
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Table 7 - FC-PI  Entry Decisions
Poisson Regression - Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Dep. Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3
C*i 1.091 (2.819) 1.111 (2.686) 1.067 (2.766)
GRi 0.146 (2.231) 0.147 (2.122) 0.133 (2.002)
CRi -3.638 (4.263) -3.731 (4.187) -3.536 (4.116)
MSi 4.737 (1.935) 5.240 (1.943) 5.024 (2.014)
SEMi 0.773 (3.391) 0.595 (1.179)
ESi -0.042 (0.103)
SEMHIGHi 0.903 (3.244)
SEMMODi 0.684 (2.676)
ESi*SEMi 0.217 (0.380)
Log likelihood -134.2 -134.1 -133.9
Restricted Log likel. -155.3 -155.3 -155-3
Chi squared 42.2 [10] 42.4 [12] 42.8 [11]
 (*) Country dummies included in all equations
Legend
Ci*: Number of countries firm  i  was not present in 1987 in its primary industry.
GRi growth rate in firm i’s primary industry between 1987-1991.
CRi: 1987 5-firm  EU concentration ratio in firm i’s primary industry.
MSi: 1987 firm i’s EU market share in its primary industry.
SEMi: dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s primary industry was identified as one of 40  “most
affected” industries to the SEM program, 0 otherwise.
ESi: dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s primary industry is characterised by relevant economies of
scale, 0 otherwise.
SEMHIGHi: dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s primary industry was identified as very sensitive
(high non-tariff barriers) to the single market, 0 otherwise.
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SEMMODi: dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s primary industry was identified as moderately
sensitive (moderate non-tariff barriers) to the single market, 0 otherwise.
Table 8 - FC-PI  Exit Decisions
Poisson Regression - Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Dep. Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3
Ci 1.545 (4.451) 1.726 (4.010) 1.493 (4.275)
GRi -0.093 (1.000) -0.100 (0.951) -0.050 (0.468)
CRi -0.224 (0.175) -0.030 (0.024) -0.471 (0.352)
MSi -17.484 (2.711) -17.354 (2.732) -16.528 (2.595)
SEMi -0.160 (0.464) 0.449 (0.722)
ESi 0.836 (1.588)
SEMHIGHi -0.503 (0.873)
SEMMODi 0.002 (0.004)
ESi*SEMi -1.115 (1.549)
Log likelihood -67.9 -66.4 -67.6
Restricted Log likel. -92.9 -92-9 -92.9
Chi squared 50.1 [10] 53.2 [12] 50.6 [12]
(*) Country dummies included in all equations
Legend: as in Table 7
Si: Number of countries firm was present in 1987 in its primary industry
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Table 9 - Regression Results:  HC-SI   Entry/Exit Decisions
Poisson Regressions - Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Dep. Variable Equation 1 - Entry Equation 2  - Exit
Si* -4.187 (4.227)
Si 1.298 (11.438)
GRi 0.022 (0.477) 0.051 (1.235)
CRi -0.776 (1.400) 0.518 (1.120)
MSi 2.888 (1.493) -2.661 (1.421)
SEMi -0.311 (2.058) -0.203 (1.510)
Log likelihood -216.5 -138.0
Restricted Log likel. -251.9 -269.6
Chi squared 70.9 [10] 263.3 [10]
(*) Country dummies included in all equations
Legend: as in Table 7
Si*: Number of industries firm was not present in 1987 in its home country
Si: Number of industries firm was present in 1987 in its home country
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Appendix 1 - List of Firms in the Sample
Name Nationality
1 ABF UK
2 ACEC - UNION MINIERE SA BL
3 AEROSPATIALE FR
4 AKZO NV NL
5 ALCATEL ALSTHOM CGE FR
6 ALLIED LYONS UK
7 ARBED groupe SA BLUX
8 AVIONS MARCEL DASSAULT BREGUET FR
9 AXEL SPRINGER VERLAG AG GER
10 BARILLA G. & R. F.LLI SPA IT
11 BASF AG GER
12 BASS UK
13 BAT INDUSTRIES UK
14 BAYER AG GER
15 BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE AG GER
16 BERTELSMANN GER
17 BOSCH-SIEMENS HAUSGERATE GMBH GER
18 BP UK
19 BRITISH AEROSPACE UK
20 BRITISH STEEL UK
21 BSN FR
22 BTR UK
23 CADBURYS SCHWEPPES UK
24 CARL-ZEISS-STIFTUNG GER
25 CIR SPA IT
26 COATS VIYELLA UK
27 CONTINENTAL GUMMI-WERKE AG GER
28 COURTAULDS UK
29 DAIMLER-BENZ AG GER
30 DALGETY UK
31 DEGUSSA AG GER
32 DEUTSCHE BABCOCK AG GER
33 DSM NAAMLOZE VENNOOTSCHAP NL
34 ELF AQUITAINE FR
35 ENI IT
36 FAG KUGELFISCHER GEORG SCHAFER KGAA GER
37 FERRUZZI FINANZIARIA SPA IT
38 FIAT SPA IT
39 FREUDENBERG GER
40 GEC GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PLC UK
41 GLAXO HOLDINGS UK
42 GRAND METROPOLITAN UK
43 GROUPE BULL-Compagnie des machines BULL FR
44 GRUNDIG GRUPPE AG GER
45 GUINNESS UK
46 HANSON UK
47 HEINEKEN NL
48 HENKEL KGAA GER
49 HERAEUS HOLDING GMBH GER
50 HILLSDOWN HOLDINGS UK
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Name Nationality
51 HOECHST AG GER
52 HOESCH-KRUPP FRIED. KRUPP AG GER
53 ICI UK
54 ING. C. OLIVETTI & C. SPA IT
55 IRI IT
56 ITALMOBILIARE SPA IT
57 KLOCKNER-HUMBOLDT-DEUTZ AG GER
58 KLOCKNER-WERKE AG GER
59 LAFARGE-COPPEE FR
60 L'OREAL FR
61 LVMH FR
62 MAN AG GER
63 MANNESMANN AG GER
64 MATRA -HACHETTE (MARLIS) FR
65 METALLGESELLSCHAFT AG GER
66 MICHELIN FR
67 NORTHERN FOODS UK
68 PECHINEY FR
69 PHILIPS NL
70 PILKINGTON UK
71 PIRELLI SPA IT
72 PSA PEUGEOT CITROEN HOLDING FR
73 PWA AG GER
74 REED-ELSEVIER UK
75 RENAULT FR
76 Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizitatswerk AG RWE GER
77 RHEINMETALL BERLIN AG GER
78 RHONE-POULENC FR
79 RMC UK
80 ROBERT BOSCH GMBH GER
81 ROLLS ROYCE UK
82 ROYAL DUTCH/SHELL NL
83 SAINT-GOBAIN FR
84 SAINT-LOUIS GROUPE FR
85 SCHNEIDER FR
86 SIEMENS AG GER
87 SMITHKLINE BEECHAM UK
88 SOLVAY BL
89 THOMSON FR
90 THORN EMI UK
91 THYSSEN AG GER
92 TOMKINS - ex RHM UK
93 UNIGATE UK
94 UNILEVER NL
95 UNITED BISCUITS UK
96 USINOR-SACILOR FR
97 VALEO FR
98 VIAG CONTINENTAL CAN EUROPE AG GER
99 VOLKSWAGEN AG GER
100 ZAHNRADFABRIK FRIERICHSHAFEN AG GER
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